Manual From Action to Cognition: 164 (Progress in Brain Research)

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Husain M, Kennard C. Elsevier, Amsterdam - North Holland. Annals of Clinical and Translational Neurology 2, ManoharSG, Husain M. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience. Cortex 49 : Cerebral Cortex 22 4 Cortex 49 4 Bays PM, Husain M. How reliable is repeated testing for hemispatial neglect?

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Implications for clinical follow-up and treatment trials. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Journal of Neuroscience Brain Abnormal attentional modulation of retinotopic cortex in parietal patients with spatial neglect. Current Biology Science In the newborn, sensory modalities and cortical pathways are not as differentiated as are those of mature brains but appear to emerge through a series of strengthening interactions between the active body and the environment Quartz and Sejnowski This implies that in infants few, if any, cortical pathways are domain specific and highly specialized for most tasks, but during development by virtue of active interactions with the environment get recruited and tuned up for processing particular stimuli Elman et alia Other empirical results in the study of sensory modalities point in the same direction, rejecting the idea that the senses are dedicated modules wired up for perception at birth, with the body's interactions with the environment playing only a secondary role in constraining or even determining the nature of perceptual processing.

Conversely, it seems that many relevant capacities are not as domain-specific as they may initially appear.


For example, even though the visual cortex appears dedicated to process a particular class of information, it can be recruited by a different sense modality during the reading of Braille—whether the subject has congenital, acquired or induced blindfold blindness Sadato et alia , ; see also Pascual-Leone and Hamilton ; Pascual-Leone et alia If we extend these observations to face recognition, further support for the hypothesis that specialization begins at later stage of development, by virtue of experience, arises.

Despite the fact that the fusiform face area FFA is highly selective to faces Kanwisher ; Kanwisher et alia , data suggest that it can also be activated in response to non-face features, such as birds and cars, provided that subjects have a substantial expertise in those categories Gauthier et alia While this evidence does not call into question the idea of brain specialization, it does indicate the role of bodily activity in generating the differentiation of cortical pathways and the emergence of specific functions, such as direction-selective responses in the visual cortex.

Embodied interactions with the world shape and control the mechanisms responsible for this information processing, offering support for the Body as Distributor and Body as Regulator theses. Additionally, consider studies investigating how switching handedness shapes cortical sensorimotor representations of finger movements. A left to right switch of handwriting not only triggers a general re-organization of motor dominance but also has a wider impact on the functional neuroanatomy of the motor system that controls the hands, influencing even motor tasks that require little skill Kloeppel et al The re-organization patterns found in converted left-handers show how flexible the brain is in terms of which regions can do what in response to educational training and hand use throughout life, and how bodily features and interaction schemas are conditions to which the brain is attuned to.

These studies can be interpreted as suggesting that embodied interactions and the beyond-the-body environment may themselves be partial realizers of the corresponding cognitive activity. Including non-neural parts of the body amongst the physically constitutive building blocks of cognition suggests a more radical reading of embodied cognition. Strong nativist claims may also be challenged when considering cognition beyond the sense modalities.

The issue concerning how much language-specific information, if any, is innate has been one of the dominant topic in cognitive science and the literature relevant to the matter provides us with a wide range of possibilities. Some Pinker ; Chomsky , , for instance, conclude that a specific innate endowment help explain several aspects of children's linguistic performance. Others Cowie ; Bates ; Bates et alia , instead, find this conception unparsimonious and puzzling from an evolutionary standpoint, and claim that nonlinguistic learning factors significantly constrain and control the range of possibilities that characterize spoken language.

Encouragement for this latter view comes from evidence that shows how language acquisition heavily depends, beyond environmental exposure, on a number of different factors, including working memory and general cognitive development Seung and Chapman, First language learning, for instance, builds on what children already know about objects and events they experienced and this knowledge background provides them with the basis onto which they can map words see E.

Clark for reviews. Their ability to develop a language is also affected by information they receive from adults and caregivers. Accordingly, they will be sensitive and prone to pick up the regularities they hear more often, such as frequent words, sounds, inflections and grammar constructions Saffran et alia ; De Villiers Also social interactions appear to be crucial to the process of language acquisition.

Children more quickly learn to name things that are physically present during a conversation and to which the joint focus of attention is directed E. Clark ; Tomasello Even language development in children affected by Autistic Spectrum Disorder ASD , commonly held to have a genetic origin, can be modulated by parental and social factors, such as gender and high level of education Grandgeorge et alia The same holds for normal development in which the size and production of a child's vocabulary appears to be deeply related to parents' lexical richness, monitoring of language interaction and socioeconomic status Hoff ; Hoff and Naigles Implications of these findings support the Body as Distributor thesis and place primary emphasis on the view that properties of language-learning process heavily depend on the environmental and social conditions within which an individual is raised.

They also indicate that direct engagement with the world and other individuals regulate language functioning and that this functioning is inseparably linked to and exploits the affordances of the situation within which language processes take place. Further support for the Body as Distributor thesis comes from evidence that differences in early gesture explain disparities in children's vocabulary size Rowe and Goldin-Meadow a. Parents frequently appealing to gesture to translate their words provide children with an opportunity to learn particular meanings by hands and this parent-child gesture use accounts for the correlation between early gesture of children at 14 months and later vocabulary skills and size at 54 months.

Although gesture is not the only factor mediating language development, evidence strongly suggests that exposure to a broader range of embodied interactions determines lexical richness and vocabulary growth. These findings collectively suggest that if learning is body-based and correlated with nonlinguistic aspects of behavior, then appeals to some forms of innateness seem unlikely to account for such features of language development.

Additional support for the Body as Distributor thesis comes from data showing the role of gestures in reasoning. According to the Gesture as Simulated Action GSA Framework Hostetter and Alibabi , gestures derive from mental simulations of actions and perceptual states that people utilize when thinking, and they affect the cognitive mechanisms in service of mental imagery, judgment and problem solving by raising activation of sensorimotor areas see Alibabi et alia for a recent discussion.

It should be clear that no form of the Embodiment Thesis denies the biological grounds of language processes and cognitive activity.

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What it challenges is the adequacy of current research programs that continue to build heavily on the idea that language and cognitive development rely on processes and mechanisms that are domain-specific and causally powerful. Embodied cognitive science has generated evidence that suggests that non-neural structures are not merely secondary resources.

Rather, they variously foster, constitute, and determine the acquisition and development of specific psychological capacities, including those operant in language and perceptual processing. In this section, we focus on five empirical domains in which an embodied perspective has motivated novel insights about cognition and the mind: visual consciousness, concepts, memory, the understanding of other minds, and moral cognition.

We limit discussion to these five topics for reasons of space and clarity, not because these are the only five to which these theoretical tools can be fruitfully applied see Gibbs for an extensive presentation and discussion of a wider range of applications. Visual consciousness is typically viewed as a process within the brain.

Yet the issues about the relationship between conscious experience and neural structures are empirically and philosophically controversial. Brain plasticity, for example, provides some reason to think that there could be different neural substrates for a given conscious visual experience, both within the same individual at different times, or different individuals at the same time.

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Hence, while seemingly obvious, upon closer examination the brain-centered view endorsed by prominent scholars, such as Koch ; Chalmers ; Metzinger ; Crick and Koch , ; Crick appears problematic. One argument concerns the incommensurability of the features of the content of visual experience. Just as the sense of our visual conscious experience depends on our implicit mastery of sensorimotor contingencies—a set of rules concerning how sensory stimulation varies as a function of movement—conscious visual experience is a temporary pattern of skillful activity.

Whether or not these authors are right, their claim is significant, as it urges neuroscientists and philosophers to pursue a rather different approach to understanding the basis of visual consciousness Gangopadhyay, Madary, and Spicer, Two striking, experimentally-generated phenomena that indicate surprising dimensions to the limitations of our explicit visual knowledge have been invoked in support of embodied views of visual consciousness.

The first of these, change-blindness Levins and Simons , occurs when changes to a visual scene are coordinated with the short periods during which a subject is saccading; the second, inattentional blindness Mack and Rock ; Simons and Chambris , when such changes occur while subjects are engaged in an attention-intensive task. Under such conditions, subjects can fail to report noticing even massive and to other observers striking changes to a visual scene, such as the appearance of a dancing gorilla walking through the middle of the scene.

These phenomena call into question the traditional assumption that the brain reconstructs detailed and accurate internal models of the visual field.

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  • This assumption, while widespread, has obscured two important points, each motivating a shift to an embodied perspective on vision:. That subjects are usually capable of noticing large changes to, and unexpected elements in, the visual field, show several things. Most importantly for present purposes, visual conscious experience is a skillful engagement with the world and heavily depends on what we do with our eyes, head and body to bring something into visual consciousness.

    Thus, body and world not only matter as sources of causal influence, but act as non-neural substrates of the machinery realizing the enactment of visual consciousness. Given the current state of neuroscience, the conclusion that phenomenal experience cannot be explained by processes in the head seems hard to accept Block Distributed consciousness has inescapable consequences.

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    One might assume, for example, that if two people with the same internal states were in different environments, their conscious experience would be different and that a brain in a vat would not have any visual conscious experience, because a brain in a vat has no body and accordingly cannot interact with the environment as we normally do.

    Regardless of how convincing these arguments are, the genuine insight about the nature of consciousness that embodied cognitive science has generated is that the character of visual experience results from the way we are dynamically hooked up to the world. When we touch an object, for example, we do not exclusively have experience of it, but while touching and being touched we experience ourselves moving, including the feeling of controlling our own body in action.

    The account that agency the sense of controlling one's own body originates in processes that evolved for interaction with the environment—that is, mechanisms for sensory processing and motor control Tsakiris et alia ; Berti et alia ; Haggard ; Farrer et alia ; Leube et alia ; Farrer and Frith ; Chaminade and Decety, —suggests that embodied experience underpins self awareness. For a recent contrasting, yet embodied, account of agency and its related disorders refer to work in phenomenological psychiatry Fuchs , , , ; Sass and Parnas ; Stanghellini Consistent with the view that consciousness and action may be closely related, brain imaging studies have shown that delusions of control, often seen in schizophrenic patients, are associated with a failure in the mechanism by which the predicted consequences of an action are linked to the intended sequence of motor commands Frith et alia Deficits of this kind suggest that the ability to control and hold conscious thoughts may recruit the same mechanisms employed in interactions with the environment.

    A common assumption in traditional accounts is that concepts are context-independent amodal symbols. There are several problems with this view and research is strong in suggesting that conceptual capacities incorporate and are structured in terms of patterns of bodily activity. Talking or thinking about objects have been suggested to imply the reactivation of previous experiences, and the recruitment of the same neural circuits involved during perception and action towards those objects would allow the re-enactment of multimodal information color, size, width, etc.

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    In principle, the view that concepts are represented through abstract symbols, rather than modality specific features, and cognition requires stable forms of representation should be either dropped or strongly revisited. Evidence reveals that people construct concepts quite differently in distinct contexts Solomon and Barsalou ; Wisniewski ; Medin and Shoben ; Barsalou and Ross , and conceptualization can vary across individuals and be different for the same individual in distinct occasions.

    Also the pattern of interaction entertained with an object may influence the way conceptualization is done. People dealing with certain items and their structural parts more frequently and extensively than others will tend to develop representations that reflect the nature of their interactions with them. Not surprisingly, distinct tree experts such as a taxonomist, a landscape worker and a park maintenance personnel will categorize trees in ways that differ from one other and from non-specialists Medin et alia These studies draw upon and reinforce the theory of perceptual symbol systems Barsalou and strongly indicate that perceptual and motor mechanisms are engaged when people perform conceptual processing.

    Further support for the theory that modalities play a pivotal role in concept representation comes from work on property verification Solomon and Barsalou ; Pecher et alia Findings demonstrated that subjects performing the task responded faster and more accurately when the previous verification was in the same modality e.

    The effect is explained by assuming that concept representation does not activate the abstract features of an object but uses the same system that is recruited for perception in different modalities. So, if the auditory system is used for hearing the sound of a blender, then to run a simulation that is, form a concept of the sound of a BLENDER the auditory system will be recruited. Slower responses in different modalities are associated with cost in switching attention, and the effort made in switching modalities speaks against the idea that knowledge is represented in a modality-free manner.

    Conversely, there should not be any differences between same-modality and different-modality conditions.